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URAP. 
I represent defendant/respondent Morris Air, Inc. Manuel Guevara, 
plaintiff/appellant, appeals from summary judgment dismissing his action. 
The appeal has been fully briefed and oral argument will be held on 
September 22, 1997. 
Manuel Guevara's reply brief on appeal argues that Morris Air did not 
offer sufficient facts in the trial court to clarify the relationship among the parties 
(Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 13-14). 
In Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. 324 UAR 20, filed August 22, 1997, the 
Utah Supreme Court observed that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Once the 
moving party has properly supported its motion, the non-moving party bear& the burden 
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of providing some evidence in support of the es?enti?1 elements of his claim in order to 
successfully oppose the motion (324 UAR at 22). 
Yours very truly, 
STRONG & HANNI 
Roger H. Bullock 
RHB/db 
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Attorney for Manuel Guevara 
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of Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele 
Hipwdl and Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell 
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On Petition for Rehearing 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
This court now grants rehearing and issues 
this opinion without hearing oral argument. We 
address whether we should uphold nummary 
judgment^in^favor of defendant McKay-Dee 
Hospital ("McKay-Dee") because plaintiffs 
Shayne Hipwell and Sherry Jensen's wrongful 
death action against McKay-Dee was barred by 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations. 
See Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4. In our prior 
opinion in this case, we reversed the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment as to all defendants 
and remanded on the issue of whether defendant 
Michael J. Healy's ("Dr. Healy") alleged fraud 
in collaborating with plaintiffs' original attorney 
was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations on 
their medical malpractice claims once they had 
retained an independent attorney. Jensen v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29 (Apr. 
4, 1997). We further held that Jensen and 
Code*Co 
Provo, Utah 
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malpractice wrongful death claim as a claim for 
fraud was not sufficient to avoid the two-year 
medical malpractice statute of limitations. Id. at 
30. In its petition for rehearing, McKay-Dee 
now claims that summary judgment in its favor 
should have been upheld because (i) Dr. Healy's 
fraud does not toll the statute of limitations as to 
Jensen and Hipwell 's claims against 
McKay-Dee; and (ii) Jensen and Hipwell's 
allegations of fraud on the part of McKay-Dee 
were properly dismissed by the trial court. 
We begin with a brief review of the facts 
relevant to our decision on rehearing. Because 
we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
we view the facts in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving parties, Jensen and Hipwell. Id. 
at 25. Jensen and Hipwell allege that Dr. Healy, 
who had staff privileges at McKay-Dee but was 
not employed by McKay-Dee, committed 
malpractice on Shelly Hipwell (Jensen's 
daughter and Hipwell's wife) while she was a 
patient at McKay-Dee. They claim that, to cover 
his alleged malpractice, he and a McKay-Dee 
doctor fraudulently transferred Shelly to 
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell further 
allege that Dr. Healy then colluded with his 
brother, attorney Tim Healy, and attorney Roger 
Sharp to prevent Jensen and Hipwell from 
learning of the malpractice Dr. Healy had 
allegedly committed. Jensen and Hipwell made 
no allegation that McKay-Dee knew about Dr. 
Healy's collusion with his brother and attorney 
Sharp. 
In our prior opinion, we held that Jensen and 
HipwelFs allegations of fraud against Dr. Healy 
were sufficient to toll the statute of limitations 
on their claims as long as they retained attorney 
Sharp. Id. at 28. However, we remanded to the 
trial court on the issue of whether Dr. Healy's 
alleged fraud was sufficient to toll the statute of 
limitations after Jensen and Hipwell retained 
independent counsel but before that counsel had 
actual knowledge of the facts constituting Dr. 
Healy's alleged fraud. Id. at 28-29. The issues 
we now address are (i) whether Dr. Healy's 
alleged fraud can also act to toll the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee; and (ii) whether 
Jensen and HipwelFs allegations of fraud on the 
part of McKay-Dee are sufficient to toll the 
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee. These 
issues were not discussed in our initial opinion. 
As to the first issue, whether Dr. Healy's 
fraudulent collusion with Jensen and Hipwell's 
original attorney can toll the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee, the general rule is 
that fraud committed by a third party in 
concealing a cause of action against another 
defendant will not toll the statute of limitations 
as to that defendant. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d 
Limitation of Actions §150 (1970). Where, 
however, there is an agency or privity 
relationship between the third party committing I 
the fraud and the defendant, our cases indicate 
that liability for the agent's negligent or 
the purposes of the principal. See Hodges v. 
Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 
1991): Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 
1053, 1057 (Utah 1989).1 On the record before 
us, we cannot determine whether Dr. Healy's 
fraud in colluding with attorney Sharp and 
attorney Healy should be imputed to McKay-Dee 
absent two factual findings: (i) that Dr. Healy 
was McKay-Dee's agent; and (ii) that Dr. Healy 
acted in whole or in part to further the aims of 
McKay-Dee. The complaint makes no 
allegations regarding these issues. We remand to 
the trial court for further proceedings. 
If the trial court finds that Dr. Healy v/as 
McKay-Dee's agent and that he acted at least in 
part to further McKay-Dee's aims, it should 
impute liability for Dr. Healy's fraud to 
McKay-Dee and toll the statute of limitations as 
to McKay-Dee to the same extent it is tolled as 
to Dr. Healy.2 If, on the other hand, the trial 
court finds either that Dr. Healy was not 
McKay-Dee's agent or that Dr. Healy acted 
"entirely on personal motives unrelated to 
[McKay-Dee's] interests," Hodges, 811 P.2d at 
157, then Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the 
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee and 
Jensen and Hipwell's claims against McKay-Dee 
are barred. 
Moving to the second issue raised on 
rehearing, Jensen and Hipwell argue that the 
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee should be 
tolled because of fraud allegedly committed by 
McKay-Dee, through one of its doctors, in 
participating in an allegedly fraudulent transfer 
of Shelly Hipwell from McKay-Dee to 
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell did not 
originally argue that McKay-Dee had committed 
fraud that would toll the statute of limitations. 
Their complaint did, however, include a count 
of constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. The 
trial court held first that the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations, section 78-14-4 of the 
Code, barred Jensen and Hipwell's claim of 
constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. In the 
alternative, the trial court ruled that the claim 
was "unsupported by the facts" and that there 
was "insufficient evidence to submit this matter 
to a jury as the fact finder." In our original 
opinion, we upheld the trial court 's finding that 
Jensen and Hipwell's claim for constructive 
fraud amounted to nothing more than a claim for 
medical malpractice, which would be barred by 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations. 
Jensen, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. We did not 
address, however, the contention that Jensen and 
Hipwell's allegations of constructive fraud on 
the part of McKay-Dee would be sufficient to 
toll the statute of limitations on Jensen and 
Hipwell's medical malpractice claims against 
McKay-Dee. We find that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment to 
McKay-Dee, ruling that Jensen and Hipwell's 
constructive fraud claim was insufficiently 
supported by the evidence and therefore could 
324 Utah Adv. Re~pT 2fr" Provo, Utah 
careful analysis of the relative burdens of proof 
and production involved in making and opposing 
a motion for summary judgment. As noted 
above, when reviewing a motion for summary 
judgment, we view all facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 25. On 
a motion for summary judgment, the moving 
party bears the burden of proof for its motion, 
namely, the burden of proving that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. However, in opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the 
ultimate burden of proving all the elements of 
his or her cause of action. Thayne v. Beneficial 
Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). 
Further, once challenged, the party who opposes 
such a motion must come forward with sufficient 
proof to support his or her claim, particularly 
when that party has had an opportunity to 
conduct discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.411 
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party opposing a 
properly supported motion for summary 
judgment umay not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his [or her) pleading, 
but his [or her] response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis 
add&d). Put another way, once the moving party 
has "brought forth evidence either tending to 
prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact or 
challenging the existence of one of the elements 
of the cause of action, the nonmoving party then 
bears the burden of aprovid[ing] some evidence, 
by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the 
essential elements of his [or herj claim." 
Thayne, 874 P.2d at 124. 
In this case, Jensen and Hipwell failed to 
provide any such evidence to support their claim 
of constructive fraud. Constructive fraud 
requires two elements: (i) a confidential 
relationship between the parties; and (ii) a 
failure to disclose material facts. See Blodgett v. 
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301-02 (Utah 1978); 37 
Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§4, 15 (1968). 
Jensen and HipwelTs complaint alleges both (i) 
that McKay-Dee's employee. Dr. Baughman, 
had a confidential relationship with Shelly and 
her family as one of her treating physicians, and 
(ii) that Dr. Baughman failed to disclose that he 
had committed medical malpractice in treating 
Shelly. McKay-Dee's motion for summary 
judgment did not challenge Jensen and Hipwell's 
assertion that Dr. Baughman had a confidential 
relationship with Shelly and her family. 
McKay-Dee's motion, however, did dispute 
Jensen and Hipwell's allegation that Dr. 
Baughman failed to disclose his alleged 
malpractice. McKay-Dee produced the 
deposition of Dr. Baughman, wherein he states, 
UI have no question at all that [Shelly] received 
care that's exemplary, that could be used as an 
example of the management of a good 
Shelly's care. McKay-Dee properly challenged 
Jensen and Hipwell's allegation that Dr. 
Baughman had failed to discharge his duty to 
disclose material facts to them, namely, the fact 
that he had committed malpractice, by producmg 
Dr. Baughman's deposition in which he states 
that he did not believe and does not believe that 
he committed malpractice. 
Jensen and Hipwell, however, as the 
nonmoving parties, utterly failed to meet their 
burden of coming forward with evidence to 
contradict Dr. Baughman's deposition testimony. 
In their opposition to McKay-Dee's motion for 
summary judgment, Jensen and Hipwell simply 
reiterate the allegations of their complaint and 
provide no support for their claim that Dr. 
Baughman failed to tell them that Shelly had 
been "left to bleed internally for several hours 
before accurately diagnosing her illness." Dr. 
Baughman's deposition testimony specifically 
and directly challenges Jensen and Hipwell's 
assertion, and they failed to provide any 
evidence to support their claim. Thus, the trial 
court correctly ruled that there was insufficient' 
evidence to submit the matter to a jury. Because 
Jensen and Hipwell's claim of constructive fraud 
against McKay-Dee was insufficiently supported 
by the evidence, such a claim cannot be used to 
toll the statute of limitations on their medical 
malpractice claims against McKay-Dee. 
We remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Justice Howe, Justice Russon, Judge Eves, 
and Judge Halliday concur in Chief Justice 
Zimmerman's opinion. 
Having disqualified themselves, Associate 
Chief Justice Stewart and Justice Durham do not 
participate herein; District Judge J. Philip Eves 
and District Judge Bruce K. Halliday sat. 
1. The cases cited also include two other factors to 
consider in determining whether an agent's conduct 
will be imputed to the principal in the employment 
context: (i) whether the employee's conduct is of the 
general kind the employee is expected to perform; and 
(ii) whether the employee's conduct occurred within 
the hours of the employee's work and ordinary spatial 
boundaries. Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156; Birhier, 771 
P.2d at 1056-57. As Dr. Healy was not McKay-Dee's 
employee, these criteria would not seem to apply to 
the question of whether Dr. Healy's acts fall within 
the scope of any agency relationship he may have had 
with McKay-Dee. 
2. We note, however, that this issue will be moot if 
the fact finder determines, pursuant to our prior 
opinion, that Jensen and Hipwell's complaint was not 
timely filed becaluse Dr. Healy's fraud did not toll the 
statute of limitations long enough. See Jensen, 314 
Utah Adv. Ref>. at 29. / 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2 (3) (k) , 78-2a-3 (2) (j) . The 
order granting summary judgment was entered on July 10, 1996 
(R.123-24). Appellant's timely notice of appeal was filed on 
August 9, 1996 (R.125-27), The Utah Supreme Court transferred 
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about December 27, 
1996. 
V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal if from a grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendant. All issues presented are reviewed as questions of law 
for correctness, with no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. See Schurtz v. BMW of North America, 814 P.2d 1108, 
1111-12 (Utah 1991). The issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether the court below erred in granting summary 
judgment to defendant on the ground that, as a travel agent, it was 
immune from liability for the negligence of a services provider, 
when the determination of that status required resolving a factual 
dispute and where the law does not recognize such immunity? 
(preserved for review at R.60-62). 
2. Whether, the court below erred in granting summary 
judgment to defendant on the ground that, under its contract with 
1 
plaintiff, it was not liable for the negligence of a third party 
where: 
a. the contract in question was internally 
contradictory and, thus, ambiguous as a matter of 
law; 
b. admissible extrinsic evidence created a factual 
dispute as to the intent of the parties and whether 
apparent or ostensible authority existed and/or, 
c. the court simply applied one part of one provision, 
without regard to the basic law of contract 
interpretation, including the need to resolve 
threshold issues such as completeness, integration 
and ambiguity? (preserved at R.55-62, 77-108). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
This appeal include no determinative constitutional provision, 
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the 
Court Below. 
Plaintiff Manuel Guevara appeals from the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment dismissing his negligence and breach of 
contract claims against defendant Morris Air, Inc. His claims 
relate to personal injuries sustained in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, 
during a vacation which he purchased as a package from Morris Air 
(R.66-69, 74). Mr. Guevara was injured while disembarking from a 
bus, during a tour which was part of the package (R.71-76). The 
direct operator of the bus was Tur Mexico (R.48), which Mr. Guevara 
alleges was the agent and representative of Morris Air (R.l-6). 
After both sides conducted discovery, Morris Air moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that it could not be held liable for the 
negligence of Tur Mexico (R.45-54) .1 
Specifically, Morris Air asserted two grounds for summary 
judgment. First, Morris Air maintained that it was merely a 
"travel agent" and that, as such, it could not be liable for the 
"independent negligence of parties performing travel services" 
(R.49-52). Second, Morris Air asserted that the charter ticket (or 
passenger agreement) specifies that "other travel suppliers [such 
as Tur Mexico] are not agents or employees of Morris Air, but are 
independent contractors . . . " and, that it disclaims liability as 
to Morris Air for any act or omission of such suppliers (R. 52-53) . 
Morris Air's motion was supported by an excerpt from i[ 13 of the 
charter ticket which contains the supposed disclaimer (R.48), and 
•^Whether or not Tur Mexico was, in fact, negligent is not at 
issue on appeal. The grounds presented for summary judgment relate 
solely to whether or not Morris Air would be liable, if Tur Mexico 
had acted negligently. 
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by its assertion that it could not "locate" any written agreement 
between itself and Tur Mexico (R.49). 
In opposing summary judgment, Mr. Guevara provided a copy of 
the entire charter ticket including the full text of ^ 13 (R.100-
8) . Notwithstanding the portion selectively offered by Morris Air, 
that paragraph also specifically provides, that: 
FOR PUBLIC CHARTER TRIPS ONLY, MORRIS AIR 
SERVICE, INC., acts as principal and is 
responsible for making arrangements with 
airlines, hotels, ground transportation 
companies, and other travel suppliers to 
provide the services and accommodations 
included in the trip. 
(R.108)(emphasis added). 
Mr. Guevara also produced additional written materials, which 
had been provided to him by Morris Air in connection with his tour 
package (R.77-86). These materials evidence a close association 
between Morris Air and Tur Mexico, including a specific statement 
that Morris Air's "Representative in Puerto Vallarta" was "Tur 
Mexico" (R.79). Mr. Guevara submitted an affidavit stating that 
Morris Air employees held Tur Mexico out as its agent, and that he 
relied upon those representations in purchasing the package (R.59-
60) . 
Morris Air filed a Reply Memorandum (R.115-21), wherein it 
maintained that Mr. Guevara's understanding of these 
representations was "not relevant" (R.116). It did not deny that 
the representations were made. Notwithstanding its assertion that 
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Mr. Guevara's understanding of U 13 was a mere conclusion, Morris 
Air also offered it's own interpretation of that disputed provision 
(R. 116-17). Unlike Mr. Guevara's interpretation, this was 
presented as mere argument, unsupported by affidavit or evidence. 
Indeed, the only "evidence" presented by Morris Air, extrinsic to 
the charter ticket, consists of its unsupported characterization 
that it was merely a "travel agent," and the fact that it could 
find no written agreement between itself and Tur Mexico.2 
By Order dated July 10, 1996, the court below granted Morris 
Air's Motion and entered summary judgment in its favor (R. 123-24). 
That Order is a bare holding, which contains no findings or 
conclusion as to the basis for the court's decision. The Order 
does not state whether the court relied upon Morris Air's status as 
a "travel agent" or upon its interpretation of the charter ticket. 
The Order does not specify whether or not the court found that 
ticket to be a complete, integrated and unambiguous agreement. It 
does not indicate what, if any, of the evidence offered by Mr. 
Guevara the court actually considered. 
B. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for 
Review. 
Mr. Guevara purchased a vacation package from Morris Air, 
which included a charter flight to Puerto Vallarta, hotel 
2Morris Air's motion for summary judgment cites to its own 
self-serving interrogatory answers as support for the proposition 
that it "acted as a travel agent" (R.48) . That is not a historical 
fact, but an ultimate factual conclusion. 
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accommodations and other services, including ground transportation 
and bus tours (R. 66-69) . Morris Air was the direct provider of the 
charter flight. Mr. Guevara's itinerary lists "Velas Vallarta" as 
his hotel and "Tur Mexico" as the provider of "other services" 
(R.81). This was a tour package, assembled and sold by Morris Air 
(R. 66-69). It was not a tour, which was operated by others and 
merely brokered by Morris Air. 
The information brochure provided by Morris Air expressly 
holds Tur Mexico out as its "Representative in Puerto Vallarta" 
(R.79) ("[w]e are being represented by Tur Mexico"). Mr. Guevara 
was advised by that document to contact Tur Mexico if he need 
assistance (R.79). Thus, although part of Tur Mexico's duties were 
to provide ground transportation, it was not simply a bus service. 
It provided a wide array of tour services on behalf of Morris Air 
(R.81, 84). Other materials provided in connection with the 
package, refer jointly to Morris Air and Tur Mexico. Buyers are 
cautioned that "Morris Air Service & Tur Mexico have no connection" 
with certain time share promotions (R.83). There is a document on 
Tur Mexico letterhead providing information from Morris Air (R.85) . 
Mr. Guevara testified that Morris Air employees made oral 
statements, that Tur Mexico was Morris Air's representative in 
Mexico (R.Ill). 
A focal point of the dispute is H 13 of the charter 
ticket/customer agreement (R.108). That provision first states, 
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that Morris Air "acts as principal" and is responsible for 
arranging certain services. It then states, that Morris Air "acts 
only as agent" of the suppliers of such services. Next, it denies 
that such suppliers are agents or representatives of Morris Air, 
and states that they are "independent contractors." Finally, 
customers are cautioned, that they are "solely" responsible for 
"[a]ny deviation from the advertised trip." The full text of that 
paragraph is as follows: 
RESPONSIBILITY: FOR PUBLIC CHARTER TRIPS ONLY, 
MORRIS AIR SERVICE, INC., acts as principal 
and is responsible for making arrangements 
with airlines, hotels, ground transportation 
companies, and other travel suppliers to 
provide the services and accommodations 
included in the trip; provided that where 
MORRIS AIR SERVICE is the airline, it is 
responsible for providing directly to 
passengers the subject air transportation. In 
all other cases, MORRIS AIR SERVICE acts only 
as agent of the respective airline(s) and 
other suppliers, and, as such, shall not be 
responsible for the provision or operation of 
such flights or other services and 
accommodations. In each case, transportation 
provided by the airline is subject to all of 
the terms and conditions of the respective 
carrier's applicable tariff and/or contract of 
carriage; refer to the air transportation 
ticket for conditions of contract and notice 
of incorporated terms, and inquire of the 
airline for additional details. Also, other 
airlines, hotels, ground transportation 
companies, and other travel suppliers are not 
agents or employees of MORRIS AIR SERVICE, but 
are independent contractors over whom MORRIS 
AIR SERVICE has no control. Accordingly, you 
hereby agree that, except as otherwise 
provided herein, MORRIS AIR SERVICE is not 
responsible or liable for any loss, injury, 
expense, damage to property, or personal 
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sickness, injury or death which results 
directly or indirectly from (a) any act or 
failure to act (including, but not limited to, 
delays), whether negligent or otherwise, of 
any other airline, hotel, ground 
transportation company, or other travel 
supplier, or (b) any other cause or act of 
whatsoever nature, beyond MORRIS AIR SERVICE'S 
direct and immediate control. Except as 
otherwise specified herein, in the event of 
non-operation of any Public Charter flight due 
to reasons beyond our control, our sole 
liability shall be to refund to you that 
portion of the price allocable to the services 
not provided. Any deviation from the 
advertised trip which you initiate is solely 
your responsibility. Other matters concerning 
your responsibilities and ours are as follows: 
(R.108)(emphasis added). 
Mr. Guevara was injured, during the course of a tour which was 
part of the "advertised trip" (R. 71-76) . When he was disembarking 
from a bus, directly operated by Tur Mexico, he was instructed by 
the driver to walk between two parked buses (R. 72-73) . One of the 
buses moved forward, pinning Mr. Guevara between them and crushing 
his pelvis (R.74-76). 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court below committed reversible error by resolving 
factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). It either made a 
determination as to the nature of defendant's relationship with Tur 
Mexico or, proceeded to interpret an incomplete and ambiguous 
contract. Even if the parties generally agree as to historical 
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facts, there exists a legitimate dispute as to the ultimate fact, 
which precludes summary judgment. Sandberg v. Klein, 575 P.2d 
1291, 1292 (Utah 1978). 
(A) 
It Was Not Disputed That Morris Air Was A Mere 
Travel Agent 
Whether or not there was an agency relationship--a central 
issue here--is fact intensive and not generally an appropriate 
subject for summary judgment. Vina v. Jefferson Insurance Co. of 
N.Y. , 761 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988); Zions First National Bank 
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095-96 (Utah 1988). Here, 
plaintiff presented evidence of written and oral representations by 
defendant, supporting the existence of such an agency relationship. 
It was, thus, error to grant summary judgment. Zions Bank, 762 
P.2d at 1095-96. 
(B) 
The Contract Is Not Unambiguous Nor Does The 
Extrinsic Evidence Undisputedly Establish That 
Morris Air Is Not Liable 
The court below also erred to the extent that its grant of 
summary judgment rests upon interpreting the parties agreement, and 
holding defendant immune from liability under i[ 13 of the charter 
ticket. 
(1) 
Paragraph 13 is internally contradictory and, therefore, 
ambiguous as a matter of law. Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co., 
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846 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah App. 1993). It specifically refers to 
Morris Air as the "principal." The court could not resolve that 
ambiguity on summary judgment. Id. 
(2) 
Because the charter ticket is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is 
admissible and must be considered in resolving the ambiguity. 
Sparrow, 846 P.2d at 1327. The extrinsic evidence offered by Mr. 
Guevara gives rise to a factual dispute, precluding summary 
judgment. Winegar, 813 P. 2d at 107. The court below erred, either 
by ignoring that evidence or by resolving the fact dispute. 
(3) 
The court below erred by granting summary judgment, on the 
basis of one part of one provision in an incomplete and ambiguous 
contract. It did so in favor of the party drafting the contract. 
In so doing, the court ignored and failed to follow standard 
cannons of contract interpretation. Cox v. Cox, 877 P. 2d 1262, 
1268-69 (Utah App. 1994); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. 
Const., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); Sparrow, 846 P.2d 1323. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal turns upon whether or not the facts of record 
undisputedly establish that, as a matter of law, Morris Air has no 
liability for the acts and omissions of Tur Mexico. See Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991)(summary judgment is 
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proper only where the material facts are undisputed and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law) . They do not, and that 
judgment must be reversed. 
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the reviewing 
court views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to 
the losing party. Id. " [I]t takes one sworn statement under oath to 
dispute the arguments of the other side . . . and create an issue 
of fact" precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 
P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) . Moreover, even if the parties generally 
agree as to the underlying historical facts, any legitimate dispute 
as to the "understanding, intention or consequences of those facts" 
still precludes summary judgment. Sandberg v. Klein, 575 P.2d 
12 91, 12 92 (Utah 1978). Here, the evidence submitted by Mr. 
Guevara creates a dispute as to the ultimate fact issues of Morris 
Air's relationship with Tur Mexico and the meaning of its agreement 
with Mr. Guevara. Summary judgment therefore, is precluded. 
The Order granting summary judgment contains no statement of 
the court's reasoning, which renders it subject to question. See 
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 115 (Utah 
1991) . Regardless of the basis of its decision, the trial court 
erred in arriving at the conclusion that Morris Air was immune, as 
a matter of law, from liability for the acts and omissions of Tur 
Mexico. To the extent that the court found that Morris Air was 
merely a "travel agent," immune from liability, it resolved a 
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legitimate factual dispute as to Morris Air's status. It also 
erred, as a matter of law, in holding that such a status confers 
absolute immunity. To the extent that the court relied upon ^ 13 
of the charter ticket, it erred either by holding that provision to 
be unambiguous or by resolving the factual dispute raised by the 
extrinsic evidence. Indeed, it is apparent that the trial court 
ignored basic rules of contract interpretation, in blindly giving 
effect to one part of one provision, without considering the whole 
contract and whether or not it was, not only unambiguous, but 
complete and integrated. 
(A) 
THE COURT BELOW COULD NOT RESOLVE THE FACT 
ISSUE OF AGENCY ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Under Utah law, the relationship between Morris Air and Tur 
Mexico--be it principal and agent, joint ventures or partners--
depends upon the facts and circumstances as a whole. See Vina v. 
Jefferson Insurance Co. of N.Y. , 761 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988) 
("agency relationship is determined from all the facts and 
circumstances"); Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1980) 
("joint venture must depend upon the facts of each case"); Accord, 
Strand v. Crannev, 607 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 1980) (joint venture is 
question of fact). A formal written contract of agency or 
association is not required to establish such a relationship. See 
Score, 611 P. 2d at 369. Moreover, the existence and terms of 
written agreements, although relevant, are not- conclusive. See 
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Score, 611 P. 2d at 369 ("agreement is less important than the acts 
and conduct of the parties"). Indeed, even if there is a written 
contract, "parol evidence is admissible" to prove agency. Garland 
v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992). See also Horrocks 
v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P. 2d 14 (Utah App. 1995) (equipment 
seller was responsible for its agent's absconding with merchandise, 
notwithstanding buyer's execution of written acknowledgement of 
receipt before actual delivery). The law does not permit one to 
hold another out as its agent or partner, then later deny that 
relationship to the detriment of innocent third parties. See 
Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980); Garland, 831 
P.2d at 110; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218-19 (Utah App. 1990). 
Mr. Guevara offered documentary and testimonial evidence 
showing that Morris Air held Tur Mexico out as its agent or 
associate. The trial court was obliged to consider that evidence, 
regardless of the existence and content of any written agreements. 
See Garland, 831 P.2d at 110. Even if those facts themselves were 
not disputed by Morris Air, the issue of whether or not they give 
rise to an agency relationship is one of fact for the jury. See 
Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 
1095-96 (Utah 1988) (summary judgment not proper as fact intensive 
issue of agency). Morris Air certainly could not obtain judgment 
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in its favor by simply asserting that it was only a travel agent, 
and by failing to produce a written contract with Tur Mexico.3 
Moreover, even if the court could accept Morris Air's self-
serving and unsupported assertion that it was only a travel agent, 
that status does not confer some sort of absolute legal immunity. 
Morris Air did cite several cases below, in which travel agents 
were held not liable for the acts or omissions of others providing 
services as part of a tour. Mr. Guevara cited to other cases, in 
which a party claiming to be a travel agent was held actually or 
potentially liable for another's acts. See Casey v. Sanbourn, Inc. 
of Texas, 478 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App. 1972) (travel agent vicariously 
liable for driver's negligence); Hudson v. Continental Bus System, 
Inc. , 317 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. App. 1958) (jury question as to 
relationship between travel agent and connecting carrier); Rookard 
v. Mexicoach, 680 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1982) (summary judgment 
inappropriate as to travel agent's liability for bus accident); 
Jacobsen v. Princess Hotels International, inc., 475 N.Y.S.2d 846 
(1984) (travel agent could be liable for hotel's negligence). 
The common denominator among both parties' cases is that they 
are fact intensive. Indeed, some of these cases specifically hold 
that summary judgment is improper in "travel agent cases" on the 
very ground, that the inquiry is too dependent upon overall 
3If anything, Morris Air's failure to deny Mr. Guevara's 
evidence would support judgment in his favor. 
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circumstances. See Hudson, 317 S.W.2d at 589; Jacobsen, 475 
N.Y.S.2d at 848-49. These cases look to the facts to ascertain 
whether or not the travel agent's involvement exceeded merely 
making reservations. See Jacobsen, 475 N.Y.S. 2d 15 848-49. Where 
the so-called "travel agent" is actually the seller of a vacation 
package, which it provides, it may be liable. Ld. Here, Mr. 
Guevara's evidence, at a minimum, raises an issue as to the fact 
that Morris Air sold a package. 
The upshot of all this, is that there is no clear rule 
immunizing a party which claims to be a travel agent. Utah 
certainly recognizes no such rule--none of the cases cited by 
either party are from Utah. However, the cases cited by Mr. 
Guevara, which recognize the fact intensive nature of the issue, 
are more consistent with Utah law governing agency and summary 
judgment. See e.g., Zions Bank, 762 P.2d at 1095-96. See also 
Rogers v. M. 0. Bitner Co. , 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987) 
(existence of joint venture "is ordinarily a question of fact"); 
Hoth, 799 P.2d at 218-19 (ostensible real estate agent held to be 
partner due to more extensive involvement). 
Here, Mr. Guevara has met his burden to proffer evidence from 
which a reasonable fact finder could conclude, that Tur Mexico was 
Morris Air's agent or associate. Contrary to Morris Air's 
suggestions, this evidence is not mere conjecture and subjective 
interpretation. It consists of specific oral and written 
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representations by Morris Air, including that it was "represented 
. . . by Tur Mexico." It includes the very nature of the package, 
which Mr. Guevara purchased. To the extent that the court below 
weighed this evidence and decided the agency issue, it clearly 
erred and must be reversed. 
(B) 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE 
CHARTER TICKET/AGREEMENT TO PRECLUDE MORRIS 
AIR'S LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF TUR 
MEXICO 
Because the Order granting summary judgment does not specify 
the basis of that decision, it becomes necessary to consider all of 
the possibilities. There are three, all of which involve some 
reversible error. First, the court may have decided that the 
contract unambiguously precluded liability. Because the very 
provision cited by Morris Air, 1 13, is internally contradictory, 
the contract is ambiguous as a matter of law. See Sparrow v. 
Tayco Construction Co., 846 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah App. 1993) . 
Second, the court may have either ignored the extrinsic evidence 
offered by Mr. Guevara or weighed that evidence in interpreting the 
contract. That, too, constitutes error because, once a contract is 
determined to be ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible and 
summary judgment is improper if such evidence gives rise to any 
dispute. See Sparrow, 846 P.2d at 1327; Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
Larsen Brothers Construction Co. . 731 P.2d 483, 487-88 (Utah 1986) . 
Third, the court may have simply applied one part of one provision, 
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without considering whether the contract was complete and 
unambiguous, and without applying basic rules of construction. See 
Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 488 (" [o]nly when contract terms are 
complete, clear and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the 
judge on a motion for summary judgment . . . [otherwise] the intent 
of the parties . . . is to be determined by the jury"). 
(1) 
Summary Judgment Is Precluded Because The 
Contract Is Ambiguous As A Matter Of Law, And 
Morris Air Submitted No Extrinsic Evidence 
Supporting Its Interpretation 
The focus here is upon H 13, to which the parties ascribe 
differing interpretations. As a threshold matter, the court below 
was required to determine whether or not that provision was 
ambiguous. See Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 
App. 1994) . The provision in question expressly states, that 
Morris Air will act as "principal" with respect to entities such as 
Tur Mexico. It then provides that Morris Air is not the agent of 
such entities, and that they are not agents of Morris Air but 
independent contractors.4 It also provides that customers are 
responsible for deviations from the package--suggesting otherwise 
4The notion, that these providers were hired by Morris Air as 
independent contractors, is inconsistent with its claim to be a 
mere booking agent. Morris Air cannot simply cast that relationship 
into whatever different form is most immediately convenient to its 
own purposes. 
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for included items. Mr. Guevara was injured during a tour, which 
was part of the package. 
A contract is ambiguous, as a matter of a law, if it gives 
rise to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Sparrow, 84 6 
P. 2d at 1327. A contract which contains internal inconsistencies is 
almost per se ambiguous. Jd. The interpretation of an ambiguous 
contract--resolving the ambiguity--is a question of fact, as to 
which summary judgment is generally inappropriate. See Records v. 
Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994). 
The contradictory references to "principal" and "agent" within 
the context of U 13, itself, render the contract ambiguous as a 
matter of law. This is particularly true where Morris Air seeks to 
rely upon a disclaimer of liability. See Interwest Construction v. 
Palmer, 923 P. 2d 1350, 1357 (Utah 1996) (exculpatory clause must be 
clear and unequivocal). Where Morris Air has specifically referred 
to itself as a "principal," Mr. Guevara's assertion that it is a 
principal is certainly a "plausible" interpretation. See Sparrow, 
846 P. 2d at 1327. The fact, that Morris Air has a different (and, 
perhaps, plausible) interpretation, does not obviate the existence 
of a contrary interpretation--it just reinforces the ambiguity. 
Given that the only extrinsic evidence was offered by Mr. Guevara, 
it seems likely that the court erroneously held the provision to be 
unambiguous. See Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108. 
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Morris Air's attempt to explain the reference to "principal" 
cannot be utilized to support summary judgment in its favor. In 
the first place, this was presented as mere argument without 
supporting evidence or affidavit. Moreover, even if Morris Air had 
offered some evidence to support its explanation, such evidence 
would be irrelevant to whether or not there was an ambiguity. See 
Sparrow, 846 P.2d at 1327; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 107-8. It would be 
admissible only as extrinsic evidence to help resolve the 
ambiguity--a fact question, which the court could not decide on 
summary judgment. See Records, 887 P.2d at 871. 
The reality is that Morris Air chose to use the term 
"principal." It cannot escape the consequences of that choice or 
eliminate that term by an after-the-fact explanation. Indeed, 
given the paucity of evidence offered by Morris Air and the rule, 
that unresolved ambiguities are construed against the drafter of 
the contract, the weight of the evidence supports Mr. Guevara's 
view. See Jones, Waldo et al. v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 
1996); Edwards & Daniels v. Farmer's Properties, 865 P.2d 1382, 
1386, n.5 (Utah App. 1993). It is certainly sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment against him, where he is entitled to the benefit 
of any reasonable inference. 
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(2) 
The Extrinsic Evidence Offered By Mr. Guevara 
Was Admissible And Sufficient To Create A 
Disputed Issue Of Fact As To The Meaning Of 
Paragraph 13 
Once a contract is determined to be ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to resolve the ambiguity. See Sparrow, 846 
P. 2d at 1327; Winegar, 813 P. 2d at 107. Because the contract here 
is ambiguous, the court below erred, if it either refused to 
consider Mr. Guevara's extrinsic evidence or weighed that evidence. 
Id. It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the impact 
of such evidence upon the meaning of the agreement between Morris 
Air and Mr. Guevara. See Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 488. 
That evidence includes the statements by Morris Air employees 
to Mr. Guevara and the other written materials received from Morris 
Air in connection with the trip. This evidence weighs in favor of 
an agency or joint venture relationship, under which Morris Air is 
vicariously liable, and against the interpretation accepted by the 
court. Morris Air offered no extrinsic evidence, but merely 
criticized Mr. Guevara's evidence as conclusory. That is not 
sufficient. Nor does the fact, that the parties are in relative 
agreement as to the historical facts eliminate the genuine dispute 
which exists as to the ultimate issue--what the parties intended 
the contract to mean. See Sandberg, 575 P.2d at 1292. 
In short, where, as here, the party against whom summary 
judgment was entered has offered extrinsic evidence in support of 
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his interpretation of an ambiguous contract, the dispute as to 
meaning is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
(3) 
The Court Below Simply Applied One 
Part Of One Provision Without 
Adhering To The Standard Canons of 
Contract Interpretation 
A contract must be construed as a whole, with all of its parts 
harmonized and accorded on meaning. Where the parties' agreement 
is embodied in more than one document or writing, all such 
documents must be considered and harmonized. See Cox v. Cox, 877 
P.2d 1262, 1268-69 (Utah App. 1994). Another relevant threshold 
matter is whether or not the contract is complete and integrated. 
See Bailey-Allen Co. , 876 P.2d at 424. Integration is an issue of 
fact, as to which "all relevant evidence is admissible." Hall v. 
Process Instruments and Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Utah 1995). 
Thus, conflicting evidence as to integration would, itself, 
preclude summary judgment. Moreover, if the contract (the charter 
ticket) is not integrated, other written materials provided by 
Morris Air are not merely extrinsic evidence of intent. They are 
part of the contract. 
The charter ticket contains no integration clause. In fact, 
H 2 0 unambiguously provides that Morris Air reserves the right to 
amend the agreement without notice. Accordingly, under the terms 
of the agreement which Morris Air drafted, its written statement, 
that Tur Mexico was its representative in Mexico, constitutes an 
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amendment to the agreement. Any doubts in this regard should be 
resolved against the party which assumed such a broad, one-sided 
advantage. 
It would appear, that the court below simply ignored the rules 
of contract construction and gave effect to one isolated provision. 
It did not expressly rule upon integration, ambiguity or clarity. 
It did not rule upon the admissibility or relevancy of any 
extrinsic evidence. It just decided that Morris Air could not be 
liable. See Interwest Constr., 923 P.2d at 1356 (exculpatory 
clause must be clear). 
Yet, courts frequently go beyond a single provision or even an 
entire written contract in ascertaining the intent of the parties. 
In Colonial Leasing, 731 P. 2d 483, the court held that the parties' 
agreement constituted a sale, notwithstanding that the written 
contract was a lease. In Sparrow, 846 P.2d 1323, the court held 
that a contract, which purported to relate to personal services, 
was actually an agreement for the sale of equipment and that the 
services were incidental. See also Freedman v. Northwest Airlines, 
638 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (City Ct. 1996) (refusing to dismiss claim by 
passenger on basis of exculpatory clause). These cases do not 
support--nor does Mr. Guevara seek--some broad and indiscriminant 
authority to rewrite contracts. These cases demonstrate that the 
corollary proposition, of blind adherence to a single, questionable 
contract provision, is equally inappropriate. What Mr. Guevara 
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seeks is to have a jury resolve the patent and obvious dispute as 
to the meaning of his agreement with Morris Air and Morris Air's 
relationship with Tur Mexico. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
In granting summary judgment in favor of Morris Air, the court 
below clearly resolved disputed questions as to fact intensive 
issues. Mr. Guevara presented substantial evidence as to these 
issues. This was clear error, and the summary judgment should be 
reversed and the case remanded for a trial on the merits. 
XI. 
ADDENDUM 
Appellant does not believe that any addendum is necessary 
here. The order appealed from is a bare grant of summary judgment, 
which contains no specific findings or conclusions. The record, as 
a whole, contains only about 125 pages. 
r i/v\ 
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